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ABSTRACT 
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Direct Payments and Land Rents 
Evidence from New Member States 
Kristine Van Herck, Jo Swinnen and Liesbet Vranken* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 62/August 2013 
1. Introduction 
A general purpose of agricultural subsidies is to increase the income of farmers. However, 
these first-order income objectives are influenced by second-order adjustments, in particular 
the impact of subsidies on factor markets. Various studies have analysed the second-order 
effects of agricultural policy measures (see e.g. Hertel, 1989; Salhofer, 1996; Dewbre et al., 
2001; Alston and James, 2002; Guyomard et al., 2004; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006, 2009). In 
general, these studies find that agricultural subsidies alter farmers’ production incentives and 
thus factor demand. An important second-order effect of agricultural policy is its impact on 
the land market, in particular on agricultural land prices (see, among others, Floyd, 1965; 
Guyomard et al., 2004; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006, 2009).  
There are two important implications. First, land price increases due to subsidies reduce the 
impact of subsidies on agricultural income. This is particularly important in the EU New 
Member States (NMS). In 2004, eight Central and Eastern European countries joined the 
European Union (EU). This accession round was followed by the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007. Since EU accession, farm support in the NMS is implemented through the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and in most countries financial support to farmers largely 
increased compared to the pre-accession level. In many NMS land reforms restituted land 
rights to the former owners who are no longer active in the agricultural sector (Mathijs and 
Swinnen, 1998). As a result, a large share of agricultural land is rented out by these absentee 
landowners.  
Second, an increase of land rents has a direct negative effect on land mobility and hence an 
indirect negative effect on farm restructuring. New farmers face a higher initial investment 
cost and existing farmers face a higher cost of expansion. Consequently, the transfer of land 
from less to more efficient users is reduced, which has a negative impact on structural 
adjustments in the agricultural sector.  
The majority of empirical studies have dealt with the land market in North America (the US 
and Canada). A few studies have empirically analysed the impact of direct payments on land 
rents in the EU (Patton et al., 2008; Kilian et al., 2008; Ciaian et al., 2010a; Breustedt and 
Habbermann, 2011). This paper focuses on a selected number of EU NMS. 
To our knowledge there is only one study that analyses the impact of direct payments in the 
NMS. In particular, Ciaian and Kancs (2009) investigate the impact of the Single Area 
Payment Scheme (SAPS) in the NMS based on farm-level panel data for the period 2004-
2005. However, this study only considers the post-accession period; while the pre-accession 
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period, when most NMS already started to provide agricultural support to their farmers, has 
not been taken into account.  
Our paper extends the Ciaian and Kancs (2009) analysis in two ways: i) we use country-level 
data and ii) we study the pre- as well as the post-accession period.1 While the use of farm- 
level data has obvious advantages, the use of longer series of country-level panel data also has 
advantages. There are two reasons for using country-level data. First, when using farm-level 
data there is only limited variation in the main explanatory variable, the level of direct 
payments after EU accession, since a substantial share of the direct payments are Single Area 
Payments (SAPS), which are in principle uniformly distributed over all agricultural land in a 
country. Second, with two-year panel data, there is only limited variation in the dependent 
variable, because of the presence of longer term contracts. The capitalisation of the direct 
payments will only occur when a new contract is signed by the land owner and the tenant. 
Hence, one needs longer time periods to capture these effects.  
We estimate the impact of direct payments on land rents. In the NMS, investigating the effect 
of agricultural subsidies on land rents is more relevant than investigating the impact on land 
values, for at least three reasons. First, rental rates are less affected by urban and other non-
agricultural pressures as contracts have only a limited duration (Whithaker, 2006). Second, 
in the NMS the number of land rental transactions is considerably higher than the number of 
land sales transactions. In the NMS, the rental market is particularly important to ensure the 
occurrence of efficiency enhancing land transfers because there are also substantial costs 
associated with enforcing property rights and obtaining the necessary documents from local 
officials required for land sales next to the usual costs associated with land transactions, such 
as notary fees, taxes and administrative charges (Swinnen and Vranken, 2009; 2010). 
Finally, rental rates are observed in the market while land value is often stated by the owner - 
because the limited number of sales transactions- and therefore subjective (Whithaker, 
2006). 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss the 
development of rental land markets in the NMS. We give a short overview on the agricultural 
policy and in particular on the use of direct payments in the NMS. The third section gives an 
overview of the existing literature on the impact of agricultural policy measures on land 
rents. In section 4, we empirically test the impact of direct payments on land rents in selected 
NMS. We conclude in section 5.  
2. Rental Land Markets and Direct Payments in NMS 
In this section we briefly review rural land markets and agricultural policy in the NMS before 
and after EU accession.  
2.1 Rental land markets 
Similar to the US and several EU15 countries, a large amount of the land transactions in the 
NMS takes place through the rental market, although there are large variations among 
countries (Table 1). In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, more than 80% of the cultivated area 
is rented. Also in Bulgaria, land renting is very prominent (79% of total land). In Hungary, 
Estonia and Lithuania, between 48% and 56% of the cultivated area is rented. In Latvia, 
Poland and Romania, the figures are lower; respectively 27%, 20% and 17%. 
There is a striking correlation between the prevalence of land rental at the country level and 
the proportion of corporate farms in total land use (Swinnen et al., 2006). While corporate 
farms own little land, they use a lot of land in some countries, almost all of which is rented. In 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, more than 70% of the total agricultural land area is used by 
                                                        
1 The disadvantage of including both pre- and post-accession data is that we are not able to disentangle 
the impact of different types of direct payments (coupled vs. decoupled), since these disaggregate 
subsidy data are – to our knowledge - not available for the pre-accession period.  
DIRECT PAYMENTS AND LAND RENTS: EVIDENCE FROM NEW MEMBER STATES | 3 
corporate farms (see Table 1, at the end of this paper). Also in Hungary, Estonia and Bulgaria, 
corporate farms still use around half of all agricultural land. A large share of agricultural land 
is still rented to the large scale successor organisations of the former cooperatives and state 
farms (Vranken et al., 2011). This can be attributed to the land reform process that was 
implemented at the start of transition. Land was restituted to former owners, of which the 
majority are not (or no longer) active in agriculture. They may be retired or living in urban 
areas and are more likely to rent it out, in particular to large-scale corporate farms, for 
several reasons. First, because of limited information about the sales price and the expected 
increase in land prices upon accession to the European Union, most of these new landowners 
were unwilling to sell their newly acquired assets and preferred to rent it out instead. Second, 
since identifying potential tenants involves search and negotiation costs, the easiest way for 
the new landowners was to rent out their land to the corporate farms, which were the 
historical users of the land (Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998). Third, the corporate management 
was closely involved in the land reform process and their search and negotiate costs to 
identify and contract with those new owners were significantly lower than the costs faced by 
newly emerging structures (particularly family farms and ‘de novo’ companies). In 
combination, these factors resulted in a higher demand for rented land by corporate farms 
than by family farms and an increased supply of rented land to corporate farms than to 
family farms. As a result, restitution has contributed to a consolidation of the large-scale 
farming structures (collective and state farms in the past, now corporate farms) through the 
land rental market. 
In the period 2000-2008, a strong and persistent increase in land rental prices is observed in 
all NMS and the increase was especially strong around the period of EU accession. For 
example, if one compares rental prices from just before (2003) to just after accession (2006), 
real land rental prices grew with more than 20% in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia (Figure 1). This large increase in land rents coincides with an increase in 
direct payments in the same period (Figure 2).  
2.2 Agricultural policy 
At the beginning of the 1990s, after the transition to a more market orientated economy, 
agricultural support dramatically reduced in all Central and Eastern European countries. 
However, when the economic and institutional climate started to improve at the end of the 
1990s, agricultural support started to increase again. Later, when the countries accessed the 
EU, agricultural support increased even further.  
There are several distinct types of support measures. First, governments can make payments 
directly to producers, so-called ‘direct payments’. Figure 2 illustrates the strong increase in 
direct payments in a selected number of NMS in the period 2000-2010.  
Before EU accession, agricultural policy in the selected NMS included a wide variety of direct 
payments. For example, in Poland there were output payments for crop production such as 
bread cereals (payment/tonne) and in the Czech Republic and Slovakia there were payments 
for livestock production such as for sheep, beef or milk production (payment per head or per 
litre). In addition, there were area payments in all countries, which are payments based on 
the cultivated area (payment/ha): for flax in the Czech Republic or for arable land in 
Slovakia, for example.  
After EU accession, there were two main types of direct payments, depending on the source 
of the subsidy. First, there is the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS), which is financed by 
the EU budget. SAPS payments are fixed payments per ha, which are decoupled from 
production and, in principle, uniform for all eligible land within each NMS.2 SAPS payments 
                                                        
2 However, there are substantial differences between the NMS. These variations stem from the fact 
that the level of per hectare payments is computed by dividing the available EU financial ‘envelope’ for 
each country by the eligible agricultural area. The EU rules for the determination of the CAP Pillar I 
financial allocations imply that higher land productivity results in higher hectare payments, as 
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are gradually implemented and they will reach the EU15 level in 2013. Second, the NMS were 
allowed to supplement the SAPS payments by national ‘top-up’ payments (or Complementary 
National Direct Payments (CNDPs)). These top-up payments can be implemented in a similar 
way to SAPS, namely as a fixed payment per ha, as in Slovakia for arable crops. However, the 
NMS can also decide to couple the support to a specific production and provide payments per 
ha or per animal head for a specific production, such as the per-hectare payment for hops in 
Slovakia or the suckler cow premium in Hungary. 
In addition to direct payments, governments can also use specific instruments, such as quota, 
and tariffs and intervention buying to support farmers’ income. These instruments create a 
gap between the domestic producer price and the world market price of a specific agricultural 
commodity and are referred to as market price support (MPS). Before EU accession, the NMS 
implemented quota, tariffs and intervention buying to protect their agricultural markets. 
After EU accession, the NMS were integrated into the common EU market and MPS was 
implemented in the same way as in the EU15, such that for the same commodity all EU 
farmers receive in principle the same level of support (single market principle). This implies 
that after EU accession the amount of MPS in a country fully depends on its production 
structure. The dairy sector is, for example, traditionally more protected than fruit and 
vegetables producers.  
3. Conceptual Model 
3.1 Support measures and capitalisation 
Various studies analysed how land markets were affected by agricultural policy measures that 
have been implemented to support farmers’ income in developed countries (e.g. Floyd 1965; 
Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 1992; Lence and Mishra, 2003; Kirwan, 2005; Ciaian and 
Swinnen, 2006, 2009). 
Capitalisation of agricultural subsidies in land rents depends on the type of support. Ciaian et 
al. (2010b) analyse the impact of different forms of coupled direct payments on land markets. 
They develop a partial equilibrium model, which combines two inputs (land and a non-land 
input) in a production function of one agricultural output.3 
According to Ciaian et al. (2010b), output payments increase the price of a factor if the supply 
elasticity of that factor is not perfectly elastic. A given percentage increase in product price 
will result in the same percentage rise in all factor prices if the factors are perfect substitutes 
in production or if the supply elasticities of the two factors are the same. If the factor supply 
elasticities are not equal, the price of the input with the least elastic supply will increase 
more. Hence, the impact of output payments on land rents depends largely upon the factor 
supply and substitution elasticities. In fact, in case the factor supply is entirely inelastic and 
the elasticity of substitution between factors is zero or the factor proportions are fixed, the 
output payment will be fully capitalised in the price of the factor with inelastic supply. If this 
factor is land, which is often the case, then the output payment will be fully capitalised in 
land rents.  
Area payments, which are targeted on land, stimulate farm land demand and in combination 
with inelastic land supply, these payments are capitalised into higher land rents, creating 
leakages of policy rents to landowners. In a corner solution, when the land supply is fixed, the 
land subsidy is fully capitalised into land rents (Ciaian et al., 2010b).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
historical yield levels (2000-2002) were factored into the determination of the financial envelope for 
Pillar I. There was a large variety in the reference yield of the different NMS, which results in a 
disparity in the direct payments. 
3 They based their model on the model of Floyd (1965), who analyses the effects of farm price supports 
on the returns to land in agriculture.  
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In summary, where the land is the most inelastic production factor, both output and area 
payments are expected to be capitalised in land rents and the price of land will increase 
relative to the price of the other factors. Where the land supply elasticity is equal to zero (or 
land supply is fixed) area payments will be fully capitalised in land rents. Output payments 
are only fully capitalised in land rents if, additional to zero land supply elasticity, either the 
supply elasticity of non-land inputs is perfectly elastic or if factor proportions are fixed.  
In addition to the type of subsidy, the capitalisation of subsidies also depends upon the exact 
policy implementation. If subsidies are only implemented for a limited period of time, they 
may not be capitalised in the land value. Also, the criteria determining the eligibility to 
receive the future stream of policy transfers, may limit the capitalisation of subsidies 
(Sumner and Wolf, 1996; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006, 2009; Kilian and Salhofer, 2008). For 
example, area payments may be subjected to cross-compliance, set-aside, or other 
requirements. If area payments are subjected to cross-compliance, then their effect on land 
rents is (partially) mitigated due to the fact that farmers have to incur certain costs in order 
to meet the eligibility criteria. 
Almost all available studies on the capitalisation of land rent use US data.4 However, the 
number of studies analysing the impact of CAP payments on land rents has increased 
recently.  
Patton et al. (2008) analyse the impact of both coupled (output) and decoupled (area and 
single farm) direct payments on land rents in Northern Ireland covering the period 1994 to 
2002. They find that the impact of CAP direct payments on rental values depends on the type 
of payment and on the nature of the production characteristics of the associated agricultural 
commodity. Also in the EU, Kilian et al. (2008) analyses capitalisation of direct payments in 
land rental prices in 2005 in Bavaria (region in Germany). They find that one additional euro 
of direct payments increases rental prices by 28 to 78 eurocents. Additionally, they evaluate 
the effect of decoupling support and they find an increase in the capitalisation ratio due to 
decoupling and an additional 15 to 19 eurocents are capitalised into land rents. 
Ciaian and Kancs (2009) investigate the impact of the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) 
in the NMS based on farm level panel data of the period 2004-2005. They find that almost 
20% of the SAPS payment is capitalised in land rents. In a related study, Ciaian et al. (2010a) 
analyse the income distributional effects of the CAP for farmers and landowners, using farm 
level panel data for the period 1995-2007 in selected member states. Their results do not 
confirm the theoretical hypothesis that landowners benefit from a large share of the CAP 
subsidies. According to their estimates, farmers gain between 60% to 95%, 80% to 178% and 
86% to 90% of the total value of coupled crop/animal, coupled RDP and decoupled 
payments, respectively. They find that CAP subsidies are only marginally capitalised in land 
rents, although the effects depend on the type of payment.  
Finally, Breustedt and Habermann (2011) analyse the impact of direct payments on land 
rents in Germany in 2001 by estimating a general spatial model to account for both spatial 
relationships among rental prices of neighbouring farmers and spatially autocorrelated error 
terms. They find that the marginal incidence of EU direct payment on land rents amounts to 
38 eurocents for each additional euro of direct payments.  
                                                        
4 Using US- county-level data from the state of Iowa, Lence and Mishra (2003) examine the impact of 
government payments on cash rents using county-level panel data for 1996-2000. Unlike most other 
studies on land values and rents, Lence and Mishra control for spatial autocorrelation and they find an 
increase in land rents of $0.13 per acre for each additional dollar of government payments. Roberts et 
al. (2003) use 1992 and 1997 farm-level panel data from the US Census of Agriculture. They find that 
an increase in cash land rents of between $0.34 and $0.41 per acre for each additional dollar of 
government payments. Using the same data, Kirwan (2005) finds in a related study that landowners 
capture on average between $0.20 and $0.40 of the marginal per acre subsidy dollar, depending on 
the region and farm size. 
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3.2 Market imperfections, land institutions and regulations 
In addition to the magnitude and type of the agricultural subsidy measure, the capitalisation 
of agricultural subsidies will also be affected by market imperfections in in- and output 
markets as well as by the land institutions and rental regulation in place (see for example, 
Chau and de Gorter, 2005; Hennessy, 1998; Latruffe and Mouël, 2009). 
First, at the end of 1990s, credit market imperfections (including credit and technology) were 
major limitations on the functioning of land markets in the NMS (Petrick, 2004). At the end 
of the 1990s, and especially in the early 2000s, under the impulse of the prospect of EU 
accession and economic growth, market imperfections started to decrease. This resulted in 
increased investments in agriculture and in an increase in farm productivity, which in turn 
led to a rise in the demand for land in the NMS. Furthermore, foreign and domestic 
investment in the food industry and agribusiness were stimulated with major positive vertical 
spillovers on farms. With EU accession direct payments started to increase, which had a 
positive impact on farmers’ investments by reducing their credit constraints (Latruffe et al., 
2010). Ciaian and Swinnen (2009) develop a theoretical model in which they analyse the 
impact of credit market constraints on capitalisation of area payments in land rents. They 
find that, in the presence of credit market imperfections, area payments increased land rents 
by more than the payment. 
Second, several studies document that land markets in the transition countries, even the 
most advanced such as in the NMS, are still characterised by the existence of significant 
transaction costs in the rural land markets. Transaction costs affect the development of land 
markets as they constrain access to land for rural households willing to start up or enlarge 
their farm and reinforce the persistence and dominance of large scale corporate farms (Ciaian 
and Swinnen, 2006). As a consequence, rental prices for land rented by corporate farms is 
often much lower than that rented by individual farms due to the combination of imperfect 
competition and transaction costs. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia land rents paid by 
corporate farms are generally much lower: they vary between 50% and 20% of the rents paid 
by family farms (Swinnen et al., 2006). In addition, corporate farms rely on in-kind rental 
payments, which are typically less transparent. They often depend on yields, which are 
difficult to control by the landowners, and may result in lower effective rent payments. As a 
consequence, the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies is expected be lower when the share 
of corporate farms in agricultural land use is higher.  
Finally, also land market institutions and regulations may affect capitalisation of payment in 
land rental rents. The most obvious case of how regulation is affecting the land market is the 
case where rental payments are regulated by the government, such as is the case in Belgium 
or France, for example (Ciaian et al., 2010b). 
4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1 Empirical model and variables 
The sample used in the empirical analysis includes six NMS: the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia. We use yearly data from 1997 to 2009 for the Czech 
Republic, from 1994 to 2009 for Poland, from 2001 to 2007 for Slovakia, from 2001 to 2009 
for Hungary, from 2000 to 2009 for Lithuania and finally from 2004 to 2009 for Latvia. This 
results in an unbalanced panel data set with 61 observations.  
4.1.1 Baseline model 
To econometrically quantify the effect of direct payments on land rents, we estimate the 
following baseline model:  
 tiitititiit ACCaOUTPUTaDPaaRENTS ,,3,2,10 εδ +++++=   (1) 
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where the dependent variable RENTSit represent the average rental price of agricultural land 
in country i in year t. RENTSi,t, is defined as the deflated country average land rental price in 
euros and data are obtained from national statistics.5  
First, the main variable of interest is the deflated average level of direct payments per ha 
expressed in euros (DPi,t). Due to data limitations, we aggregated output and area payments, 
although it is possible that the effect differs between the two types of subsidies.6 Before EU 
accession, DPi,t are obtained from OECD and are calculated as the sum of the OECD support 
categories “Payments based on output” and “Payments based on area planted/ number of 
animals” divided by the total utilised agricultural area as obtained from Eurostat. After EU 
accession, DPi,t are calculated as the sum of SAPS payments and national top up payments 
based on national statistics,7 divided by the total utilised agricultural area as obtained from 
Eurostat. Given the theoretical evidence of the capitalisation of direct payments (see section 
3), we expect a positive coefficient of the DPi,t variable.  
Second, to capture the effect of market returns on land rents, we include the variable 
OUTPUTi,t which is the deflated agricultural output value per hectare, expressed in euros and 
based on data obtained from Eurostat. We expect a positive correlation between land rents 
and agricultural output value per hectare.  
Third, EU accession is expected to affect land markets directly by freeing them and 
integrating them into a single EU market. Indirectly, EU accession will also affect land 
markets as it improved the functioning of other factor markets (including credit and 
technology) and stimulated foreign and direct investments in the food industry and 
agribusiness, with sizeable spillovers on farming. In order to control for these effects, we 
include a dummy variable ACCi,t which equals one from the year of accession (2004) onwards 
and zero otherwise.8 
Finally, we also include country fixed effects (δi) in order to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity that remains fixed over time. Since both coupled and decoupled direct 
payments are based on regional productivity levels, there is an unobserved country level 
effect for which we control by relying on a fixed effects estimation such that direct payments 
are exogenous within the country, but endogenous between the different NMS.9 
4.1.2 Extensions of the baseline model 
We extend the baseline model in four ways. First, we include two different sets of explanatory 
variables to control for the prices of substitutes for land on the one hand, and for market 
imperfections due to incomplete institutional reforms on the other. Second, we estimate the 
impact of market price support measures by disentangle the variable OUTPUTi,t into one 
variable capturing the market return without subsidies and one variable capturing the market 
price support per hectare. Third, we analyse the interaction between the level of direct 
payments and credit market imperfections. Finally, we analyse the interaction between the 
                                                        
5 VUZE for Czech Republic, GUS, ANR and Zagorski for Poland; VUEPP for Slovakia; the Central 
Statistical Office for Hungary; Lithuanian Institute of Agricultural Economics and the State Enterprise 
Centre of Agricultural Information and Rural Business; FADN for Latvia.  
6 See theoretical insights presented in section 3.  
7 Green Report (Ministry of Agriculture) for Czech Republic; ARiMR and ARR for Poland; Green 
Report (Ministry of Agriculture) for Slovakia; Payment Agency for Hungary; the Lithuanian Institute 
of Agrarian Economics for Lithuania; Rural Support Service for Latvia. 
8 The variable ACC is expected to be correlated with the variables DP and OUTPUT. In addition to the 
full baseline model, we also estimated a restricted model in which we exclude the ACC variable in 
order to test for the robustness of our coefficients. 
9 In addition to regional productivity, coupled direct payments also depend on the individual 
production choice of the farmer. However, on a country level we believe that the production structure 
is relatively stable over the time period that we consider, such that including country fixed effects 
eliminates a large share of the endogeneity bias.  
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level of direct payments and the country’s farm structure (share of land cultivated by 
corporate vs. individual farmers).  
Control variables10 
First, in order to control for changes in the prices of substitutes for agricultural land, we will 
estimate the following model:  
 tiitititititiit ALPaIPaACCaOUTPUTaDPaaRENTS ,,5,4,3,2,10 εδ +++++++=   (2) 
where RENTi,t, DPi,t, OUTPUTi,t, ACCi,t and δi are defined as in section 4.2 IPi,t, is the 
agricultural input price index, based on fertilizer and fodder prices. Data are obtained from 
Eurostat. In addition, we include agricultural labour productivity (ALPi,t), which is a proxy for 
agricultural wages. Agricultural output data are obtained from FAO and labour data from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). Most empirical research on land rents do not 
control for price changes of other inputs which are, to a limited extent, substitutes for 
agricultural land. However, theoretically, in the case where the elasticity between substitutes 
for land is not zero, this affects the level of capitalisation of the coupled direct payments (see 
section 3.1). An increase in IPi,t, as well as in ALPi,t is expected to have a positive impact on 
land rents.  
Second, there might still be market distortions in the NMS related to the transition process, 
which started in 1989. In order to control for the progress in the reform process, we estimate 
the following model:  
 tiititititiit EBRDaACCaOUTPUTaDPaaRENTS ,,6,3,2,10 εδ ++++++=   (3) 
where RENTi,t, DPi,t, OUTPUTi,t, ACCi,t and δi are defined as in section 4.1.1. EBRDi,t equals 
the EBRD reform indicator, which rates the progress of a country’s reforms in several areas.11 
The effect of this EBRDi,t variable remains unclear. We expect that in countries with better 
reforms in different sectors surrounding agriculture, landowners feel more secure to rent out 
land (contracts will be more enforceable, for example). As a result, the supply of land will be 
increased, which will temper land rents. On the other hand, improvements in other 
surrounding markets, such as the credit market, may result in higher demand for land, which 
may result in a positive correlation between EBRDi,t and land rents. 
Disentangle the effect of market price support and net market return 
The variable OUTPUTi,t captures two effects i) the effect of market price support (MPSi,t) and 
ii) net market return (MKRi,t). In order to disentangle these two effects we include MPSi,t and 
MKRi,t separately in the regression which results in the following model: 
 tiitibtiatiit ACCaMKRaMPSaDPaaRENTS ,,32,2,10 εδ ++++++=    (4) 
where RENTi,t, DPi,t, ACCi,t and δi defined as in section 4.1.1. MPSi,t is a proxy for the market 
price support and is obtained from OECD.12 MKRi,t is a measure for market return and is 
                                                        
10 Note that we include the two sets of control variables in two different model specifications and we do 
not include all control variables in one regression. This is not possible since a fixed effects estimation 
of our model only allows us to include a limited number of independent variables. This is an important 
limitation of our study. 
11 The EBRD transition indicator gives a score from 1 to 4. It aggregates assessments of the 
privatisation of small- and large scale enterprises, enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade 
and foreign exchange system liberalisation, competition policy, bank and non-bank financial sector 
reforms. The general EBRD indicator is the average of the score given to the reforms in each area. A 
high value of the general indicator is associated with a higher level of reform and hence better working 
institutions. 
12 For the pre-accession period, data on market price support are provided by OECD for each country. 
For the post-accession period, OECD provides data for producer support equivalents for the EU as a 
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calculated as the difference between OUTPUTi,t and MPSi,t. Both MPSi,t and MKRi,t are 
expected to have a positive impact on land rents. 
Interaction between direct payments and credit market imperfections 
Credit market imperfections may affect the capitalisation of direct payments in land rents, as 
explained in section 3.2. In order to test the interaction between direct payments and credit 
market interaction we estimate the following model: 
 tiitititititiit DPCREDITaCREDITaACCaOUPUTaDPaaRENTS ,,8,7,3,2,10 * εδ +++++++=   (5) 
where RENTi,t, DPi,t, OUTPUTi,t, ACCi,t and δi are defined as in section 4.1.1. CREDITi,t equals 
the EBRD’s index, which rates the progress in the country’s bank and non-bank financial 
sector reforms. The index ranges between 1 and 4, where a higher value of the index indicates 
more reform in the financial sector and this is usually associated with better access to credit. 
Reduced credit constraints and improved access to credit are expected to result in a higher 
demand for agricultural land; we therefore expect a positive correlation between CREDITi,t 
and land rents. In addition, we include an interaction term between the variables CREDITi,t 
and DPi,t. As predicted by the theoretical work of Ciaian and Swinnen (2009), we expect that 
in the presence of credit constraints capitalisation of direct payments in land rents is more 
important since direct payments may help to improve farmers’ access to credit (e.g. use of 
direct payments as collateral for bank loans). Therefore we may expect a negative impact of 
the interaction term on land rents.  
Interaction between direct payments and farm structure 
The structure of the farm sector (agricultural land use by corporate vs. individual holdings) 
may affect the capitalisation of direct payments in land rents, as explained in section 3.2. In 
order to test the interaction between direct payments and the farm structure we estimate the 
following model: 
 tiitittititiit DPCFaCFaACCaOUPUTaDPaaRENTS ,,109,3,2,10 * εδ +++++++=    (6) 
where RENTi,t, DPi,t, OUTPUTi,t and δi are defined as in section 4.1.1. CFi is the share of 
agricultural land used by corporate farmers and is based on data obtained from Eurostat. 
Since the share of land used by corporate farms hardly varies over time, we included CFi as 
time-invariant variable.13 When agricultural land use is dominated by corporate farms, 
landowners face significant transaction costs, such as bargaining costs with the farm 
management of the corporate farms to change the allocation of the land, which is expected to 
be reflected in lower land rental prices (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006). In addition, we include 
an interaction term between CFi,t and DPi,t since we expect that capitalisation of direct 
payments will be stronger when more land is used by individual farms (see section 3.2).  
Table 2 gives an overview all variables used in the estimation. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
whole without making a disaggregation at country level. Therefore, for the most important 
commodities we calculate the difference between the internal price, which is the EU price, and the 
world market price. This price difference can be seen as a measure of the magnitude of the price 
support per unit of a specific commodity. This price difference is then multiplied by the country-level 
output of the specific commodity. In addition, we determined the magnitude of the market price 
support for the ‘other commodities’, which is provided by OECD for the EU as a whole, based on the 
country’s share in total EU production. 
13 When we estimate the model by a fixed effects model estimation, CFi will be dropped since this time 
the invariant variable is multicollinear with the fixed effect (δi).  
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4.2 Regression results 
4.2.1 Baseline model results 
The regression results are presented in Table 3. The first column (model A) presents the 
estimation results of a restricted fixed effects model in which we only include direct payments 
(DP) as an explanatory variable. The second column (model B) presents the estimation 
results of a restricted model in which we include, in addition to direct payments (DP), 
agricultural output (OUTPUT) as an explanatory variable. Finally, the third column (model 
C) presents estimation results of the full baseline model.14  
Direct payments (DP) are found to have a positive and significant impact on land rents, 
indicating that there is rent extraction of government payments by landowners. The impact is 
not only statistically significant, it is also economically significant. An increase of one 
additional euro per ha in direct payments increases land rents by 13 to 25 eurocents. The sign 
and magnitude of the impact of direct payments on land rents is similar to the findings of 
Ciaian and Kancs (2009), who analysed capitalisation in land in the NMS during the period 
2004-2005 using farm level data.  
Further, we find that higher levels of agricultural output (OUTPUT) are correlated with 
higher rental prices. An increase of one additional euro per ha of agricultural output is 
expected to lead to an increase of the land rental price by 5 eurocents.  
Next, EU accession (ACC) significantly increases land rents, indicating that since 2004, the 
year of EU accession for all selected NMS, land rents increased by almost 5,51 euro per ha. 
The coefficient of DP remains stable (significantly positive and of the same order of 
magnitude) when the variable ACC is included in the baseline model (see model B and C in 
Table 3). This clearly indicates that the variable ACC is capturing ‘other’ effects of accession, 
beyond the direct subsidy or output price effects.  
4.2.2 Extensions of the baseline model 
The extensions to the baseline model are included in Table 4. The control variables IP and 
ALP are added in model D, while model E includes the control variable EBRD. In model F, we 
disentangle of the land productivity variable into the effect of net market return (MKR) and 
market price support (MPS). The extension in which we analyse the interaction between the 
level of direct payments and credit market imperfections is given by model G and finally the 
results of the estimation in which we include the interaction between the level of direct 
payments and the country’s farm structure are displayed in model H.  
The results of the extended model estimations confirm the finding of the baseline model that 
direct payments have a statistically and economically significant impact on land rents. In 
addition, we also find consistent coefficient estimates for the variables OUTPUT and ACC. In 
the extended models D, E and F, the coefficients for these variables are close to the 
coefficients in the baseline model, suggesting robust findings.  
We do not find a significant impact of the control variable IP on land rents, while the ALP 
variable has positive impact on land rents. This means that when agricultural labour 
productivity is higher, land rents are higher ceteris paribus. The EBRD has a significantly 
negative coefficient, which implies that average land rents are lower in case of more 
institutional reforms (e.g. better functioning input and output markets). This is an indication 
that the positive effects of institutional reforms on land supply seem to outweigh the 
potential effects on land demand. This is not surprising as land owners will be, for example, 
more likely to rent out their land when proper institutions are in place to enforce contracts. 
                                                        
14 We also estimated a model with time-fixed effects but the results of the F-test indicate that the time-
fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. We therefore present the results of the model with country-fixed 
effects only. In addition, we report all regression results using clustered standard errors. 
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As a consequence land supply will increase and hence rental prices will decline so that the 
capitalisation is tempered.  
When we disentangle output into MPS and MKR, we do not find a significant coefficient for 
MPS, while for the MKR variable we find a significant positive coefficient which is of the 
same order of magnitude as the coefficient of the OUTPUT variable. Hence, an increase of 
one additional euro in net market return increases the average land rental price by 5 
eurocents.  
The results of model G with the interaction between direct payments and credit market 
constraints show that, in the presence of credit market constraints, direct payments will be 
more capitalised in land rental prices than in the presence of well-functioning credit markets. 
As such our results confirm the theoretical work on the interaction of direct payments and 
credit constraints by Ciaian and Swinnen (2009). In the case of poor functioning credit 
markets (i.e. no reforms in the financial sector or CREDIT = 1), an additional euro of direct 
payments results in an increase of 40 eurocents in the average land rental price. In the case of 
well-functioning credit markets (CREDIT = 4), however, only 16 eurocents per additional 
euro of direct payments is capitalised in land rents. On the mean level of CREDIT variable in 
the sample (CREDIT = 3.59), an additional euro of direct payments is reflected in an increase 
of 19 eurocents in the average rental price. 
Finally, the regression results confirm our expectation regarding the impact of a country’s 
farm structure. We find that in countries where a larger share of the agricultural land is used 
by corporate entities (and hence more imperfect competition), a lower share of the direct 
payments is capitalised in the average rental price. Where all agricultural land is used by 
individual farmers (CF = 0), an additional euro of direct payments is reflected in an increase 
of 21 eurocents in the average rental price, but where all agricultural land is used by 
corporate farms (CF = 1), only 4 eurocents are capitalised in the average rental price. On the 
mean level of CF in the sample (0.38), an additional euro of direct payments is reflected in an 
increase of 15 eurocents in the average rental price. 
5. Conclusion 
While agricultural subsidies were introduced to increase the income of farmers, agricultural 
subsidies also induce second-order adjustments so that they alter farmers’ production 
incentives and thus factor demand. In this paper, we estimate the second order effect of 
direct payments on the rural land market in selected NMS. EU accession resulted in a 
considerable change in the level of subsidies paid in the NMS, which allows us to estimate the 
impact of the increase in direct payments on land rental prices. We find that direct payments 
have a positive and significant impact on land rents, indicating that there is rent extraction of 
government payments by landowners. This impact is not only statistically significant, it is 
also economically significant. An increase of one additional euro per ha in direct payments, 
increases land rents by 13 to 25 eurocents. Since renting is widespread in several NMS and 
since most landowners are often absentee landowners who live in urban areas or who are no 
longer active in agriculture, the payments will flow out of the agricultural sector and are to a 
large extent missing their goal of improving the livelihoods of rural inhabitants in the NMS. 
In addition, we find that the level of capitalisation depends on market imperfections, in 
particular credit market imperfections, and the country’s farm structure, which affects 
transaction costs and imperfect competition in the land rental market.  
Capitalisation of direct payments is higher in more credit constrained markets, with the level 
of capitalisation ranging from 40 eurocents (in the case of poor functioning credit markets) 
to 16 eurocents per additional euro of direct payments (in the case of well-functioning credit 
markets). Direct payments may reduce farmers’ credit constraints, for example because 
farmers may use the direct payments as collateral for bank loans. As a consequence, the 
marginal productivity of agricultural land increases, which will in turn boost the demand for 
agricultural land as theoretically shown by Ciaian and Swinnen (2009). 
12 | VAN HERCK, SWINNEN & VRANKEN 
 
With respect to the farm structure, we find that capitalisation of direct payments is lower in 
countries characterised by a significant share of agricultural land used by corporate farms. 
Per additional euro of direct payments, the level of capitalisation in the land rental price 
ranges from 21 eurocents if all land is used by individual farmers to 4 eurocents if all land is 
used by corporate farms. Hence, in the countries where the farm structure is dominated by 
corporate farms, the level of capitalisation of direct payments is found to be lower, suggesting 
that transaction and imperfect competition temper capitalisation. Corporate farms typically 
pay lower rental prices than family farms, are more likely to pay rents in kind than family 
farms (who pay cash), have rental contracts of longer duration (locking in land), and often 
use their political powers/relationships to influence policies that shift effective land property 
rights in their favour. While government policies may not directly favour corporate farms, 
they may still be biased towards corporate farm interests because of technical requirements 
related to land exchange and withdrawal procedures, because of complex and expensive land 
registration procedures, and because of established relations between farms (managers), 
officials and firms up and downstream, such as agribusiness and food processors.  
All this clearly illustrates the importance of reforms focused on market institutions and on 
improving access to input and output markets, as well as of reforms of sectors ‘surrounding 
agriculture’. Such reforms are crucial to improve access to land by farmers, to induce 
structural change in the sector and to ensure that agricultural subsidies are not missing their 
goal of improving the livelihoods of rural inhabitants in the NMS.  
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Table 1. Share of rented agricultural land and land used by corporate farms in the EU-27 (%) 
Share rented land Share used by corporate farms 
  2005 2007 2005 2007 
Belgium 67 67 5 10 
Bulgaria 76 79 53 53 
Czech Republic 86 83 71 71 
Denmark 25 29 2 5 
Germany 62 62 31 32 
Estonia 48 50 44 48 
Ireland 18 18 0 0 
Greece 32 32 0 0 
Spain 28 27 31 32 
France 72 74 50 54 
Italy 23 28 18 13 
Cyprus 50 54 7 8 
Latvia 24 27 10 9 
Lithuania 53 48 12 14 
Luxembourg 54 57 0 0 
Hungary 57 56 51 52 
Malta 80 81 7 7 
Netherlands 26 25 8 7 
Austria 26 27 17 19 
Poland 20 20 10 10 
Portugal 24 23 25 28 
Romania 14 17 35 35 
Slovenia 30 29 5 5 
Slovakia 91 89 82 80 
Finland 34 34 8 9 
Sweden 40 39 18 19 
United Kingdom 31 32 15 13 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 2. Description of the variables in the land rents regression 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
Dependent variable 
RENTS Deflated average land rents (€/ha) 42.51 28.6 
    
Main variable of interest 
DP Deflated direct payments per ha (€/ha) 79.97 57.99 
    
Control variables 
MKT Deflated market value output (€/ ha) 746.84 361.78 
ACC Accession dummy (0/1) 0.56 0.50 
IP Agricultural input price index (100=2007) 89.38 14.66 
ALP Agricultural Labour Productivity (deflated €/worker) 745.34 1558.64 
EBRD EBRD transition indicator (score 1 to 4) 3.52 0.28 
MPS Market Price Support (€/ha) 105.93 61.79 
MKR Market Return (€/ha) 640.92 354.58 
CREDIT EBRD indicator for financial reform (score 1 to 4) 3.59 0.36 
CREDIT_DP Interaction term CREDIT and DP 302.47 235.44 
CF Share of land cultivated by corporate farms (0 to 1) 0.38 0.29 
CF_DP Interaction term CF and DP 35.04 39.71 
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Table 3. Regression results of the fixed effects baseline model 
 Model A Model B Model C 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
DP 0.25 (5.88)*** 0.17 (9.50)*** 0.13 (10.96)*** 
       
OUTPUT - - 0.05 (2.32)* 0.05 (2.07)* 
ACC - - - - 5.51 (2.62)** 
     
Constant 22.61 (6.68)*** -8.37 (-0.51) -7.23 (-0.42) 
    
R² 0.71 0.79 0.80 
Observations 61 61 61 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1% 
We used clustered standard errors and within R2.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on the constructed sample. 
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Table 4. Regression results of the fixed effects model of the extensions to the baseline model 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
DP 0.12 (15.54)*** 0.15 (12.86)*** 0.13 (29.42)*** 0.48 (4.34)*** 0.21 (4.89)*** 
           
OUTPUT 0.04 (2.54)* 0.05 (2.15)* - - 0.06 (2.28)* 0.04 (2.04)* 
ACC 6.22 (3.04)** 7.10 (3.04)** 5.71 (2.37)* 6.80 (1.70) 4.47 (1.42) 
          
IP  0.09 (0.71) - - - - - - - - 
ALP 0.00 (2.04)* - - - - - - - - 
EBRD - - -12.24 (-3.03)** - - - - - - 
           
MPS - - - - 0.05 (2.08)* - - - - 
MKR - - - - 0.04 (1.87) - - - - 
           
CREDIT - - - - - - -13.05 (-1.44) - - 
CREDIT_DP - - - - - - -0.08 (-3.33)** - - 
           
CF_DP - - - - - - - - -0.17 (-2.83)** 
           
Constant -13.46 (-0.62) 29.73 (2.82)** -6.30 (-0.39) 29.81 (2.00) -4.06 (-0.29) 
      
R² 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.84 0.83 
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1% 
We used clustered standard errors and within R2.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on the constructed sample. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of land rents in the selected NMS (€/ha) 
 
* Rental prices are real 2010 prices  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the constructed sample 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of direct payments in the selected NMS (€/ha) 
 
* Direct payments are real 2010 prices  
Source: authors’ calculations based on the constructed sample. 
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